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This paper studies the ethical underpinnings of two social criteria which are prominent
in the literature dealing with the problem of evaluating allocations of several consumption
goods in a population with heteregenous preferences. The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion (Pazner-
Schmeidler [22]) and the Walrasian criterion (Fleurbaey and Maniquet [7]) are prima facie quite
diﬀerent. But it is shown here that these criteria are related to close variants of the fairness
condition that an allocation is better when every individual bundle in it dominates the average
consumption in another allocation. In addition, the results suggest that the Pazner-Schmeidler
criterion can be viewed as the best extension of the Walrasian criterion to non-convex economies.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D63, D71.
Keywords: social welfare, social choice, fairness.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The problem of deﬁning criteria for social decisions has long been the topic of welfare
economics and then of social choice, but an impressive array of diﬃculties and negative
results have been obtained. Surplus criteria and related compensation tests have been
criticized as unethical and inconsistent,1 while Arrow’s impossibility theorem of social
choice (Arrow [1]) has been reproduced in all relevant contexts and came to be recognized
as a major obstacle. The most trodden way out of this impossibility deadlock, which has
been promoted in particular by Sen (e.g. [24]), is to rely on interpersonally comparable
measures of individual well-being. An alternative approach consists in taking account
of information about individual preferences at so-called “irrelevant alternatives”.2 This
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1For a recent survey on this issue, see Blackorby and Donaldson [2].
2Arrow’s theorem involves an axiom of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” which requires the
ranking of two alternatives to depend only on individuals’ preferences over these two alternatives. This is
1approach, which has recently produced a variety of interesting criteria in various contexts,3
is adopted in this paper.
The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion (Pazner and Schmeidler [22], Pazner [21]) and the
Walrasian criterion (Fleurbaey and Maniquet [7]) evaluate allocations of resources with
the aim of equalizing the value of bundles consumed by individuals. This preference for
equality is expressed by relying on the maximin principle, that is, by giving priority to the
worst-oﬀ: Both criteria strictly prefer an allocation if the worst bundle in this allocation
has a higher value than the worst bundle in another allocation. These two criteria diﬀer
only in how to measure the value of bundles. The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion measures
the value of a bundle by t h ep e r c e n t a g eo ft o t a lc o n s u m p t i o nthat his owner would accept in
exchange for it. The Walrasian criterion is less simple, and measures the value of a bundle
by the percentage of total consumption that his owner would accept in exchange for it, with
the possibility of making further trades at reference market prices. These reference market
prices are selected so as to maximize the smallest value of all bundles in the contemplated
allocation. This means that, in general, reference market prices are diﬀerent from one
allocation to another. An important property of the Walrasian criterion, when individual
preferences are convex, is that, among all feasible allocations in an exchange economy, it
selects the egalitarian Walrasian equilibria (i.e. equilibria in which all agents have equal
budgets) as the best allocations. Another important property of both criteria is that, by
taking account of individual preferences, they satisfy the Pareto principle according to
which an allocation must be deemed strictly better than another if all individuals strictly
prefer the bundle they receive in it.4
The purpose of this paper is to compare these two criteria, through an analysis of
their properties in economies with convex individual preferences, and also in economies
with general (convex or non-convex) preferences. Such an analysis reveals the ethical
underpinnings of the criteria, and should help in the choice of one criterion or the other.
The purpose here is not simply to provide lists of properties satisﬁed by the criteria, and
tightness of the analysis is obtained by looking for combinations of properties that logically
imply the basic deﬁnition of the criteria. This reduces the choice between the criteria
to a basic choice between mutually exclusive combinations of ethical principles. The
main properties considered in this paper have to do with Pareto eﬃciency, preference for
equality, informational parsimony. Detailed deﬁnitions of these notions will be provided
after the formal framework has been introduced. As an outline of the main results, let
especially restrictive in an economic context, since it makes it impossible to prefer an allocation because it
is, say, eﬃcient or competitive and egalitarian in budgets, etc. This kind of evaluation typically requires
information about preferences at alternatives other than the two considered. For further explanation and
illustration, see below.
3See e.g. Pazner [21], Fleurbaey and Maniquet [7], [9] about the division of unproduced commodities,
Fleurbaey and Maniquet [8] about production of a private good, Maniquet and Sprumont [20], [19] about
production of a public good, Maniquet [18] about indivisibles, Fleurbaey [4] about health.
4Reﬁnements of the criteria satisfy the stronger Pareto principle according to which strict preference
for one individual only, and weak preference for the rest of the population, is enough to entail strict
preference for the social criterion.
2us ﬁrst indicate that, in convex economies, the properties which separate the two criteria
are not so divergent. In particular, it is shown that one and the same equity condition,
formulated in two slightly diﬀerent ways, leads either to the Walrasian criterion or to the
Pazner-Schmeidler one. This equity condition is an extension to the case of multiple goods
of the simple requirement that a distribution is better than another when its support is
above the mean of the other. This may be called support-mean dominance. In a one-
dimensional context, support-mean dominance implies generalized Lorenz dominance.5
Here, the proposed adaptation of this condition to the multi-dimensional context says
that an allocation x is at least as good as another, y, when all bundles in x dominate
the average bundle of y. Stated in this way, however, this condition is incompatible with
the Pareto principle, and restrictions are needed in its application. Depending on what
restriction is applied, one obtains a (partial) characterization of either of the two criteria.
These results conﬁrm those of earlier literature about the fact that these two criteria
are prominent if not unchallengeable. They also show, by a joint characterization with
similar structure, that the diﬀerence between the two criteria is not so strong as it may
appear at ﬁrst glance. The Walrasian criterion is just slightly more sensitive to eﬃciency
of the allocation of resources, whereas the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion has a stronger
preference for the equal-split allocation. Another, perhaps more striking, result is that,
when considering the general case of convex or non-convex preferences, a weak requirement
which is satisﬁed by both criteria in convex economies (namely, the intersection of the
two axioms used for the characterization results in convex economies) uniquely singles
out the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion in this wider domain. The analysis deﬁnitely leads to
rejecting the Walrasian criterion in non-convex economies, even if it is well deﬁned and
still satisﬁes some good properties in that domain.
As brieﬂy alluded to above, an essential feature of the approach adopted in this pa-
per is that the only data about individual welfare are non-comparable preferences over
consumption bundles, so that no interpersonal comparisons of utility are performed. The
basis of interpersonal comparisons is the value of bundles, as measured with the help of
individual indiﬀerence curves. For further explanations on this approach and its relation
to the literature, see e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet [7], [9] and Fleurbaey, Suzumura and
Tadenuma [11], [12]. In particular, this approach has been outlined long ago by Samuel-
son [23] and Pazner [21].6 The latter introduced the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion as it is
deﬁned here. Fleurbaey and Maniquet [7] introduced the Walrasian criterion and Fleur-
baey and Maniquet [9] have characterized the two criteria in convex economies, but on
the basis of quite diﬀerent properties for each of them. Fleurbaey [3] and Tadenuma [28]
also characterized the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion but did not study the other one.7 This





i=1 y(i), where x(i) denotes the i-th value in (x1,...,xn) by increasing order.
6Additional discussions of the approach can be found in Fleurbaey and Hammond [6] and Fleurbaey
[ 5 ]i nr e l a t i o nt oi n t e r p e r s o n a lc o m p a r i s o n s ,a n di nF l e u r b a e ya n dM o n g i n[ 10] in relation to the Bergson-
Samuelson brand of welfare economics.
7Tadenuma [27] studies the construction of social preferences on the basis of the no-envy criterion
(deﬁned below), which is indirectly related to the Walrasian criterion.
3paper pursues the analysis, with diﬀerent requirements which make it easier to compare
the two criteria, and with an extension of the analysis to non-convex preferences.
The next section introduces the model and the main concepts. Then Section 3 presents
basic ethical requirements that may be imposed on any reasonable social criterion. The
support-mean equity condition is introduced in Section 4, and leads to a double charac-
terization of the two social criteria mentioned above. Section 5 extends the analysis to
the case of non-convex preferences, and Section 6 concludes. An appendix collects the
proofs.
2 The Pazner-Schmeidler and Walras orderings
Like an important part of the literature (Kolm [16], Pazner and Schmeidler [22], Sprumont
and Zhou [25], among many others), we focus here on the canonical consumption problem,
i.e. the problem of distributing a ﬁxed bundle Ω ∈ R`
++ of ` goods (` ≥ 2)t on individuals
(n ≥ 2). An allocation is a list of bundles, one for each agent: x =( x1,...,xn) ∈ Rn`
+ .
Every agent i = 1,...,n has a preference ordering8 Ri over R`
+, and xi Ri yi (resp., xi Pi yi,
xi Ii yi) denotes weak preference (resp., strict preference, indiﬀerence). Preferences are
assumed here to be monotonic (xi ≥ yi implies xi Ri yi and xi À yi implies xi Pi yi)9 and
continuous. Let R denote the set of such orderings, and Rc the subset of R containing
convex preferences.
An allocation is feasible if
Pn
i=1 xi ≤ Ω. The set of feasible allocations is denoted F(Ω).
An allocation x ∈ F(Ω) is eﬃcient if for no other allocation y ∈ F(Ω),y i Ri xi for all i
and yi Pi xi for at least one i.
A social ordering function (SOF) is a mapping which, for every economy in a domain,
determines a (social) ordering over the set of feasible allocations F(Ω), with standard
notation xRy ,xPy ,xIy .Two domains of economies will be considered here. The
domain D is the set of economies deﬁned by a number n ≥ 1, ap r o ﬁle (R1,...,Rn) ∈ Rn
and a bundle Ω ∈ R`
++, while the domain Dc is restricted to proﬁles in (Rc)
n . The domain
Dc will be referred to hereafter as the set of convex economies.
The Walrasian SOF, denoted RW, is deﬁned as follows:







where ui is a money-metric utility function computed as the fraction of the value of Ω











An equivalent, more graphical, deﬁnition, goes by saying that this SOF relies on the
minimal bundle proportional to Ω and contained in the convex hull of the union of the
individual closed upper contour sets (see point W in Fig. 1 –the thick curves are the
agents’ indiﬀerence curves, and the thin line below them delineates the convex hull).
8An ordering is a reﬂexive, transitive and complete binary relation.















Figure 1: Evaluation of an allocation by RW and RPS
This SOF is closely related to the market mechanism, as its ﬁrst best selection always
coincides, in convex economies, with the subset of Walrasian equilibria with equal budgets.
Pazner and Schmeidler [22], as an alternative to competitive solutions (and the related
no-envy criterion –deﬁned below) proposed to select the allocations which are Pareto-
optimal, and such that every agent i is indiﬀerent between his bundle and a particular
bundle proportional to Ω, that is, such that for some real number λ, one has xi Ii λΩ for
all i. A st h e ym e n t i o ni nt h e i rp a p e r ,a n dP a z n e r[ 2 1]f u r t h e rc l a r i ﬁed, this solution to
the distribution problem can also be described by referring to the following SOF, denoted
RPS :





where vi is a representation of i’s preferences deﬁned by:
vi(xi)=m i n {υ | υΩ Ri xi}.
An equivalent deﬁnition, which shows a closer link to the Walrasian SOF, is as follows:









Or, more graphically: This SOF relies on the minimal bundle proportional to Ω and
contained in the union of the individual closed upper contour sets (see Fig. 1,p o i n t
P). In this deﬁnition the only diﬀerence with the Walrasian SOF lies in the convex hull
operation applied by the latter to the union of upper contour sets. This remark is at the
root of the analysis of this paper.
3 Basic requirements
These two SOFs appear to be prominent in this model, according to the literature. And
they are directly related to the two prominent allocation rules in this context, namely, the
Walrasian equilibrium with equal budgets, and the egalitarian-equivalent allocation rule.
The former has long since been identiﬁed as important in discussions about the existence
5of envy-free10 and eﬃcient allocations (e.g. Kolm [16]) and has later been axiomatically
characterized by Gevers [14], Thomson [29], and many others. The latter has only recently
been justiﬁed axiomatically by Sprumont and Zhou [25].
The two SOFs RW and RPS satisfy basic requirements, such as the following Pareto
condition.
Weak Pareto: If x and y are such that for all i, xi Pi yi, then xPy .
They also satisfy an intuitive egalitarian requirement. It applies to pairs of agents with
identical preferences, when one agent’s bundle dominates the other’s, and this inequality
is reduced by a positive transfer. The axiom says that such a reduction of inequality is
acceptable. The appeal of this axiom is rather obvious and it can be related to the Pigou-
Dalton principle of transfer, which is central in the theory of inequality measurement. It
can also be justiﬁed on grounds of reducing the intensity of envy, since the agent with the
worse bundle envies the other one, while the other does not envy him.
Transfer Principle: If x and y are two allocations, and i and j are two agents with
identical preferences, such that for some δ À 0,
xi = yi − δ À xj = yj + δ,
whereas for all other agents k, xk = yk, then xRy .
Another kind of appealing condition is satisﬁed by the two SOFs. This condition,
due to Hansson [15], is a weakening of Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(Arrow [1]). While Arrow’s condition requires social preferences on a pair of allocations to
depend only on individual preferences over this pair, Hansson’s condition requires social
preferences on a pair of allocations to depend only on individual closed upper contour
sets at these allocations. In other words, only indiﬀerence curves at the bundles under
consideration should matter, and the rest of the preference relations can be disregarded.
This condition is very appealing because it guarantees that social preferences will not be
sensitive to far-fetched details of the preferences. At the same time, it makes it possible
to take account of relevant features which are excluded by Arrow’s restrictive condition.11
Hansson Independence: Let x and y be two allocations, and R, R0 be the social or-
derings for two proﬁles (R1,...,Rn) and (R0
1,...,R0
n) respectively. If for all i, all q ∈ R`
+,
xi Ii q ⇔ xi I
0
i q






10Agent i is said to envy agent j if xj Pi xi. An allocation is envy-free if no agent envies any another,
i.e. if for all i,j, xi Ri xj.
11For a more extensive discussion of Arrow’s condition, see in particular Fleurbaey and Maniquet [9].
6Finally, we will introduce two basic conditions of invariance, one relative to the scale of
the allocation, the other relative to the size of the population. These conditions are quite
uncontroversial and seem to be satisﬁed by all reasonable SOFs. The ﬁrst one says that
rescaling preferences and allocations alike does not change the ranking. It may be com-
pared to the standard scale invariance condition for the measurement of relative inequality,
usually formulated for one-dimensional distributions of income. The fact that preferences
are rescaled too here (this cannot be made explicit in a one-dimensional framework) makes
the condition even more acceptable, because this means that individual evaluations are
attuned to the new scale.
Scale Independence: Let x and y be two allocations, and R the social ordering for the
proﬁle (R1,...,Rn). Take λ > 0. Let x0 = λx, y0 = λy and R0 the social ordering for the
proﬁle (R0
1,...,R 0






The second condition is formulated in terms of invariance to replication. Consider
an economy with n agents, a proﬁle (R1,...,Rn), and a bundle Ω. A k-replicate of this
economy has kn agents, a proﬁle with Ri appearing k times for i = 1,...,n, and a bundle
kΩ. An allocation x =( x1,...,xn) in the initial economy can be related to a replicated
allocation x(k) in the k-replicate, where clones of agent i receive xi.
Replication Independence: Consider an economy with a social ordering R, and let





All the axioms introduced in this section are satisﬁed by the two SOFs deﬁned above
(and many others). In the next sections, we turn to the diﬀerences between the two SOFs.
4 Analysis in convex economies
So far, the only axiom which expresses some concern for equity in the distribution of
resources is Transfer Principle. This axiom displays a weak aversion to inequality and is
quite innocuous as it applies only to agents with identical preferences. It certainly cannot
capture all concerns for the distribution, and we will introduce here additional conditions
having to do with simple comparisons of bundles. The leading idea here is that if all
bundles in one allocation physically dominate the average bundle in another allocation,
then there is a presumption in favor of the former. When dealing with one-dimensional
distributions, the fact that the support of one distribution is greater than the mean of
another distribution implies generalized Lorenz dominance and therefore guarantees that
the former distribution is preferred by any reasonable social ranking. But in the multi-
dimensional case, can we conclude that x is preferable to y? In other words, can we
introduce the following axiom? Let y denote the mean 1
n
P
iyi (and similarly for any
other allocation).
7Support-Mean Dominance: For any pair of allocations x,y, if for all i, xi À y, then
xRy .
Unfortunately, this axiom is incompatible with Weak Pareto, simply because it may
happen that y dominates x for all individual preferences. This is another instance of the
well-known diﬃculty of formulating simple equity conditions in terms of bundles without
violating the Pareto principle.12 In order to avoid a conﬂict with Weak Pareto, one must
therefore weaken this axiom by restricting its scope. Here are various ways of doing
so. Taking inspiration from Steinhaus [26] and Sprumont and Zhou [25], one may ﬁrst
restrict application of the axiom to the case when x is the equal-split allocation in which
every agent receives xi = Ω/n. This is not enough to avoid a conﬂict with Pareto, and
in addition one may require the other allocation y to be suﬃciently unequal so that it
contains a bundle, which can be denoted miny, such that for all i, yi ≥ miny. This yields
the following axiom,13 which is satisﬁed by RPS but not by RW :




À y À miny,
then xRy .
Another way to avoid the conﬂict is to require the equal-split allocation x to be eﬃcient.
This yields the following axiom, which is almost equivalent to a standard axiom of equity
saying that when equal-split is eﬃcient, it must be selected as one of the best allocations.






This axiom is quite weak and is satisﬁed by both RW and RPS. But there is a quite
natural way to strengthen it which separates the two solutions. Instead of requiring x to
be the equal-split solution, one may require it simply to dominate an equal-split allocation
for a smaller amount of resources, and the latter to dominate the mean of y.14 This yields
the following axiom, which is satisﬁed by RW on the domain Dc but not by RPS :
12See e.g. Fleurbaey and Trannoy [13] for an analysis of this diﬃculty.
13There are similar axioms in the literature. Fleurbaey and Maniquet [9] have a much stronger axiom
saying that equal-split is at least as good as any allocation such that one agent prefers Ω/n to his own
bundle. Fleurbaey [3] has an axiom saying that for allocations in which every bundle is proportional to
Ω, equalizing the bundles does not yield a worse allocation. It is neither weaker nor stronger than this
one.
14This way of strenghtening the axiom could be applied to Support-Mean Dominance I as well, without
altering any of the results.
8Support-Mean Dominance II: For any pair of allocations x,y, if x is eﬃcient and for






Notice that these axioms are compatible with any degree of aversion to inequality
(including zero), since
xi À y for all i ⇒ x À y.
The reasons why the two Support-Mean Dominance axioms are appealing are, however,
slightly diﬀerent. Support-Mean Dominance I expresses a stronger preference for equal-
split whereas Support-Mean Dominance II reﬂects a greater sensitivity to eﬃciency.
The following results do not exactly characterize RW and RPS, but show that they
are the coarsest orderings15 satisfying these combinations of axioms.
Theorem 1 Let R be a SOF which, on Dc,s a t i s ﬁes Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle,
Hansson Independence, Scale Independence and Support-Mean Dominance I. Then for all
allocations x,y,
xP PS y ⇒ xPy .
Theorem 2 Let R be a SOF which, on Dc,s a t i s ﬁes Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle,
Hansson Independence, Scale Independence, Replication Independence, and Support-Mean
Dominance II. Then for all allocations x,y,
xP W y ⇒ xPy .
Theorem 1 does not involve Replication Independence and can be formulated for a
subdomain relative to a ﬁxed Ω (only changes of preferences are considered). In order
to prove both theorems it is convenient to rely on the following lemma. It extracts an
inﬁnite inequality aversion from the ﬁrst basic axioms.
Lemma 1 If on D or Dc, aS O Fs a t i s ﬁes Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle, Hansson
Independence and Scale Independence, then it satisﬁes the following property:
If x and y are two allocations, and i and j are two agents with identical preferences
denoted R0, such that
yi P0 xi P0 xj P0 yj,
whereas for all other agents k, xk Pk yk, then xPy .
The intuition for the proof of the two theorems can be explained as follows. Consider

































Figure 3: xPx 0
Suppose that, contrary to the desired conclusion of Theorem 1, one has yRx .By
Hansson Independence, other indiﬀerence curves could be anything. Moreover, by Hans-
son Independence and Lemma 1, it is always bad to separate further two agents who are
on nested indiﬀerence curves, since they could have the same preferences.
Deﬁne a new allocation x0 by giving the same bundle x0
1 = x0
2 to both agents, just
below v2(x2)Ω, on the ray deﬁned by Ω (Fig. 3). For a moment, assume that x0 and all

















Figure 4: y0 Py
15One may say that R0 is (weakly) coarser than R when xRyimplies xR 0 y or, equivalently, when
xP 0 y implies xPy .
10Similarly, an allocation y0 better than y by Weak Pareto can be constructed by raising
agent 1 to y0
1, and agent 2 to y0
2 just above v2(y2)Ω (Fig. 4). By transitivity, y0 Px 0.
Then, because indiﬀerence curves are nested, one can invoke Hansson Independence
and Lemma 1, and improve on y0 by pulling down agent 1 from y0
1 to a bundle just above
x0
1, and raising agent 2 to a bundle just above y0
2. This yields a new allocation y00 which










So far, we have assumed that all allocations involved in the reasoning were feasible.
This cannot be true in general. But by a suitable scale reduction of allocations and
preferences, all the allocations may be rendered feasible. The above reasoning then leads
to allocations λy00 and λx0 which are homothetic reductions of y00 and x0 and belong to
F(Ω). By Scale Independence, λy00 is preferred to λx0. Now use a scale expansion, leading
to two allocations λλ
0y00 and λλ




i = Ω. By Scale Independence,
λλ
0y00 is preferred to λλ
0x0. But the latter is the equal-split allocation, so that Support-
Mean Dominance II implies that it is at least as good as λλ
0y00, a contradiction. This
contradiction proves that the assumption yRxwas wrong. Necessarily one must have
xPy ,which is the desired conclusion.
Here is an illustration of the proof of Theorem 2. Consider again allocations x and y
on Fig. 2. Imagine that, contrary to the result of Theorem 2, one has yRx .Recall that
by Hansson Independence, other indiﬀerence curves could be anything. Therefore, by a
combined use of Weak Pareto, Lemma 1 and Hansson Independence, one can show that
















Figure 5: xPx 0
By transitivity, yPx 0. Now, by Replication Independence, every agent can be given
an arbitrarily large (but equal) number k − 1 of clones without altering the comparison,
so that y(k) P(k) x0(k). Let y0 be an allocation such that one agent of each sort is just
better-oﬀ than in y, while all her k −1 clones are given x0
2 (see Fig. 6). By Weak Pareto,
y0 P (k) y(k). By transitivity, y0 P (k) x0(k).
Then, because indiﬀerence curves are nested, one can refer to Hansson Independence
and notice that every clone who receives x0
2 in y0 could have the same preferences as any of
the initial agents. Therefore, by Lemma 1,t h ec l o n e sa tx0


























Figure 6: y0 P(k) y
the agents who are just above y, in arbitrary proportions. This yields a new allocation y00
which is just above the indiﬀerence curves at y, and if the bundles in y00 are well located,





























Figure 7: y00 P(k) y0
Again, Scale Independence makes it possible to deal with the feasibility of all allo-
cations considered in the argument. As above, a λ-reduction and a λ
0-expansion lead
to two allocations λλ
0y00 and λλ
0x0(k) such that the former is preferred to the latter and Pn
i=1 λλ
0x0
i = Ω. But for the λλ
0-rescaled individual preferences, λλ
0x0 is eﬃcient and so
is λλ
0x0(k) in the replicated economy. Therefore Support-Mean Dominance II implies that
λλ
0x0(k) is at least as good as λλ
0y00, a contradiction.
5 Extension to non-convex economies
On the larger domain D, the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF still satisﬁes Support-Mean Domi-
nance I, but the Walrasian SOF does no longer satisfy Support-Mean Dominance II. This
is actually the symptom of an important ethical drawback of the latter SOF.
It is well known that the competitive mechanism may break down in non-convex
economies. This diﬃculty has echoes in the theory of fairness, for instance in the possi-
12ble non-existence of envy-free and eﬃcient allocations (Varian [30]), or even of eﬃcient
allocations in which no individual bundle strictly dominates another (Maniquet [17]).
The Walrasian SOF RW partly remedies this diﬃculty. It selects Walrasian allocations
with equal budgets whenever they exist, even in non-convex economies, and is well deﬁned
in all economies, including the non-convex. But, unfortunately, this last fact does not
guarantee that it always yields appealing social preferences in non-convex economies. The
following example may show the problem.
Fig. 8 displays an economy with two agents, where the ﬁrst-best optimal allocation for
the Walrasian SOF RW is quite unequal, and this seems rather unjustiﬁed when one looks















Figure 8: A ﬁrst-best allocation for RW
The problem displayed in this particular example can be partly alleviated by consid-
ering a constrained Walrasian solution, that focuses only on the part of upper contour
sets which is included in the Edgeworth box. But this does not tackle similar problems
due to strange shapes of indiﬀerence curves within the Edgeworth box. In contrast, the
Pazner-Schmeidler SOF always avoids such gross inequalities and, at the minimum, al-
ways guarantees that, at the ﬁrst-best optimal allocation, all agents are at least as well-oﬀ
as at the equal split allocation.
Let us consider the axiom which combines the restrictions of application of Support-
Mean Dominance I and II. This yields a very weak axiom, which is weaker than Eﬃcient
Equal-Split.





À y À miny,
then xRy .
It is satisﬁed by both RW and RPS in convex economies, and seems to be a minimal
condition to require in non-convex economies as well. A natural question, now, is whether
one can ﬁnd an interesting extension of RW to non-convex economies which, like RPS,
satisﬁes this minimal condition on the larger domain as well. Whether the answer is
13positive or negative is a matter of interpretation, but its substance is certainly quite
precise, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let R be a SOF which, on D,s a t i s ﬁes Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle,
Hansson Independence, Scale Independence, and Minimal Preference for Equality. Then
for all allocations x,y,
xP PS y ⇒ xPy .
The main argument for this result is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.N o t i c et h a t
in the illustration of the proof of Theorem 1 in the previous section, allocation x0 was
egalitarian, but not eﬃcient. In the domain of non-convex preferences, it is now possible
to obtain an egalitarian and eﬃcient allocation by giving a non-convex preference relation
to agent 1,w i t ha ni n d i ﬀerence curve just below the envelope of the union of upper contour














Figure 9: x0 is egalitarian and eﬃcient
Notice that this cannot be done in one step because the Leontief indiﬀerence curve of
agent 2 would cut her indiﬀerence curve at x. But this can be done in three steps. First,
one puts both agents down, so that agent 1’s indiﬀerence curve already contains agent 2’s
one. Then by Lemma 1, they can be put further apart and agent 2 is raised to a bundle
high enough so as to be on indiﬀference curves that (after use of Hansson Independence)
do not cut the target Leontief curves at x0
2 = x0
1 (as well as at other relevant allocations).
Finally, both are pulled down again to x0, with the indiﬀerence curves as in Fig. 9. The
rest of the argument is similar.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The results of this paper suggest that the diﬀerences between the Walrasian SOF and
the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF are rather small. In convex economies, they diverge on the
fact that the former favors eﬃcient allocations more, while the latter favors equal-split
in a more direct way. In non-convex economies, the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF appears to
be the best one, even if one refers only to properties satisﬁed by the Walrasian SOF in
14convex economies. In a sense, then, for non-convex economies one can view RPS as the
best extension of RW, a rather surprising idea.
The possibility to deﬁne appealing social preferences is important if one looks for
social criteria applicable in cost-beneﬁt analysis and the like. This was, after all, the
main motivation in good old welfare economics. The two criteria characterized here can
be extended and applied in various contexts, although signiﬁcantly diﬀerent models (with
production, for instance, or public goods) deserve a full-blown analysis of their own.16
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Appendix: Proofs
Let coA denote the closed convex hull of set A (i.e., the closure of the ordinary convex
hull). For any bundle z ∈ R`
+, and any set A ⊂ R`
+, let




+ | q + z ∈ A
ª
.
The notation z<Ameans that for all q ∈ A, z < q, and A<Bmeans that for all q ∈ A,
q0 ∈ B, q < q0.


















+ | qI i xi
ª
.
Proof of Lemma 1: Let x and y be two allocations, and i and j two agents with identical
preferences denoted R0,s u c ht h a t
yi P0 xi P0 xj P0 yj,
whereas for all k 6= i,j, xk Pk yk.
We ﬁrst focus on the domain Dc.
17First case: C(R0,y i) ≯ I(R0,x i) ∩ R`
++.17 Choose x0 ∈ I(R0,x i) ∩ R`
++ such that




j be bundles proportional to x0 a n ds u c ht h a t
x
1
i = x0; y
1
i I0 yi; x
1
j I0 xj; y
1
j I0 yj.
Since C(R0,y i) ≯ x0, there exists b y0 ∈ I(R0,y i), such that for all q<b y0,
q/ ∈ co[{x0} ∪ C(R0,y i)].
Necessarily b y0 6= y1
i since y1
i >x 0 and obviously x0 ∈ co[{x0} ∪ C(R0,y i)].
If b y0 À 0, let y0 = b y0. Otherwise, take a sequence (b y0t)t → b y0 such that b y0t À 0 and




jt be bundles proportional to b y0t a n ds u c ht h a t
b x
2
it I0 xi; b y
2
it = b y0t; b x
2



























For all t, qt < b y0t and, since limε2
t > 0, limqt < b y0. Therefore
limqt / ∈ co[{x0} ∪ C(R0,y i)].
This convex hull is closed so that there is t∗ such that
qt∗ / ∈ co[{x0} ∪ C(R0,y i)].































































; bj = aj + ε





; dj = cj + ε
1.
Recall that ci À x1
i = x0, so that
co[{ci} ∪ C(R0,y i)] ⊂ co[{x0} ∪ C(R0,y i)],
17Continuity and monotonicity of preferences, together with xi P0 0, imply that I(R0,x i)∩R`
++ is not
empty.
18and since bi ¿ qt∗,
bi / ∈ co[{x0} ∪ C(R0,y i)].
Therefore, for η À 0 small enough, one can have
bi / ∈ co[{ci} ∪ (C(R0,y i) − η)] ⊂ c(R0,x i).
Besides, by construction (values of ε1,ε2), bi P0 xi and yi P0 ci.
By Hansson Independence, the ranking of x and y depends only on I(R0,x i),I(R0,y i),
I(R0,x j),I(R0,y j), so that the other indiﬀerence curves can be modiﬁed at will. Therefore
one can let
C(R0,c i)=co[{ci} ∪ (C(R0,y i) − η)],

















































For k 6= i,j, let ak,b k,c k,d k be chosen so that
xk Pk dk = ck Pk bk = ak Pk yk.
Assume for the moment that the allocations a,b,c,d are feasible. By Weak Pareto,
aPy , cPband xPd .By Transfer Principle, bRaand dRc .By transitivity, xPy .
If any of the allocations a,b,c,d is not feasible, let λ < 1 be such that λa,λb,λc,λd
are feasible. Let R0 be the social ordering for the proﬁle (R0
1,...,R0
n) such that for all i
and all bundles q,z, qRiz ⇔ λqR0
iλz. By the above argument, one has λxP 0 λy, and by
Scale Independence, xPy .
Second case: C(R0,y i) >I(R0,x i)∩R`
++. One can ﬁnd zi such that yi P0 zi P0 xi and
neither C(R0,y i) >I (R0,z i) ∩ R`
++ nor C(R0,z i) >I (R0,x i) ∩ R`
++. Take zj such that
xj P0 zj P0 yj. By the above argument, one shows that zPyand xPzseparately, so
that by transitivity xPy .
On the domain D, one can no longer be sure that for η small enough,
co[{ci} ∪ (C(R0,y i) − η)] ⊂ c(R0,x i).
One can instead let
C(R0,c i)=co[{ci} ∪ (C(R0,y i) − η)] ∩ (C(R0,x 0 + η)),
for η small enough so that bi / ∈ C(R0,c i) and x0 + η ¿ ci. T h er e s to ft h ep r o o fi st h e
same.
19Lemma 2 Let two allocations x,y and one agent i0 be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0 and yi Pi xi





For any SOF R satisfying Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle, Hansson Independence and
Scale Independence, one then has xPy .
Proof: For simplicity of notation, let us assume that i0 = n. Let z0,...,zn−1 be a sequence
















(For i = 1, this formula reads










n−1 Pn−1 yn−1 Pn−1 xn−1.)







Notice that necessarily xi Pi 0 for all i 6= n, so that the allocations z1,...,zn−2 exist.
However, they may not all be feasible, but by Scale Independence one can work on a
reduction of these allocations (details can be worked out as in the proof of Lemma 1).












∀q, xn Rn q ⇒ C(R
k,q)=C(Rn,q)
Such a relation exists thanks to the fact that





For k = 1,...,n − 1, let (R1,...,Rk−1,R k,R k+1,...,Rn−1,R k) be a proﬁle with related













w h i l ef o ra l lo t h e ra g e n t si, zk
i Pi z
k−1
i . Therefore, by Lemma 1, one has zk P (k) zk−1.























so that by Hansson Independence, zk P (k) zk−1 if and only if zk Pz k−1.
By transitivity, one obtains zn−1 Pz 0, that is, xPy .
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :






Suppose that, contrary to the desired result, one has yRx .
Let α,β,γ,δ,λ,λ
0 and ω be such that










and let i0 be an agent such that minivi(yi)=vi0(yi0).
Notice that λ ≤ 1. Let (R0
1,...,R0
n) be the proﬁle obtained by λ-reduction. That is,
for every i, qRiz ⇔ λqR0
iλz. Let R0 denote the corresponding social ordering. By Scale
Independence, λyR 0 λx.
Let x0 be an allocation deﬁned by x0
i = βΩ for all i. Since λnβ ≤ 1, λx0 belongs to
F(Ω). By Weak Pareto, λxP 0 λx0. By transitivity, λyP 0 λx0.
Let (R1
1,...,R1
















+ | q ≥ λωΩ
ª
,
and let R1 denote the related social ordering. By Hansson Independence, λyR 1 λx0.
Let y0 be an allocation deﬁned by y0




Since λ((n − 1)ω + δ) ≤ 1, λy0 belongs to F(Ω). By Weak Pareto, λy0 P 1 λy. By transi-
tivity, λy0 P1 λx0.
Let (R2
1,...,R2




















+ | q ≥ λαΩ
ª
,
and let R2 denote the related social ordering. By Hansson Independence, λy0 P2 λx0.
21Let y00 be an allocation deﬁned by y00
























i for all i 6= i0. By Lemma 2, one has λy00 P2 λy0,
so that by transitivity, λy00 P2 λx0.
Notice that λ
0 ≥ 1. Let (R20
1 ,...,R20








0z. Let R20 denote the corresponding
social ordering. By Scale Independence, λλ
0y00 P20 λλ
0x0. One has, for all i, λλ
0x0
i = Ω/n.




















Finally, we check that no axiom is redundant. That is, if one axiom is dropped, then
one can ﬁnd a SOF R which satisﬁes the remaining axioms and such that xP PS y does
not imply xPy .
Dropping Weak Pareto. Take the SOF e R1 such that x e I1 y for all x,y.
Dropping Transfer Principle. Let I(x) the set of allocations which are Pareto-indiﬀerent















+ | ∃i,∀j 6= i, xj ≥ xi
ª
.
Take the SOF e R2 deﬁned by:
x e R





2(x)=m i n{λ ∈ R+ | ∀z ∈ I(x) ∩ D, λΩ ≥ z}.
Dropping Hansson Independence. Take the SOF e R3 which coincides with RPS if there
are agents with identical preferences, and with e R2 otherwise.
Dropping Scale Independence. Let Z =( zα)α∈R+ be a monotonic path (i.e. for all






+ | ∃λ ≥ 0,q= λΩ
ª
= {0,Ω/n}.
For all i, let wi be a utility function representing Ri and deﬁned by xi Ii zwi(xi). Take the
SOF e R4 deﬁned by
x e R





22Dropping Support-Mean Dominance I. Take RW.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :
Let x and y be two allocations such that xP W y. Suppose that, contrary to the result,








and α,β,γ,δ,λ,ς and ω be such that
maxp miniui(xi,p) > α > β > γ > δ > λ > maxp mini ui(yi,p),
ω > ς > max{maxivi(xi),maxivi(yi)}.
Let R0
i0 be such that
C(R
0
i0,x i0)=C(Ri0,x i0),C (R
0
i0,y i0)=C(Ri0,y i0),

















+ | q ≥ ωΩ
ª
.
For i 6= i0, let R0
i be such that
C(R
0










+ | q ≥ ωΩ
ª
.
Let R0 be the social ordering for the proﬁle (R0
1,...,R0
n). By Hansson Independence,
yR 0 x.
In order to reduce notational complexity, it is assumed that all constructed allocations
below are feasible. Using homothetic reductions of preferences and allocations and invok-
ing Scale Independence always makes it possible (see the proof of Th. 1 for a rigorous












i0 = αΩ. By Weak Pareto, xP 0 x0, so that yP 0 x0.
Let x00 be such that for all i 6= i0,x 00
i = ωΩ, while x00




















23there exists an allocation y0 and positive integers a1,...,an such that y0
i P0











i ai, and consider the k-replicate of the economy, with related social ordering
R0(k). Let the agents’ labels in the replicate be denoted it for the tth version of agent i, with
t = 1,...,k and i = 1,...,n. Consider the allocation y00 such that y00
i1 = y0
i, and y00
it = ωΩ for
all t =2 ,...,k. By Weak Pareto, y00 P0(k) y, and therefore, by Replication Independence
and transitivity, y00 P0(k) x00(k).
Let the allocation x000 be deﬁned by x000
i01 = δΩ,x 000
i0t = γΩ for all t =2 ,...,k, and
x000
it = ςΩ for all i 6= i0. By Weak Pareto, x00(k) P 0(k) x000. Let the allocation x∗ be deﬁned
by x∗
i01 = λΩ and x∗
it = ωΩ for all (i,t) 6=( i0,1). By Lemma 2, x000 P0(k) x∗, so that
y00 P 0(k) x∗.




nk) deﬁned by: R00
i1 = R0
i for all i,
and among the (k−1)n remaining agents (who all have ωΩ in both y00 and x∗), ain−1 of
them have a preference relation equal to R0
i. By reordering the agents, and letting si = ain










so as to have R00
ij = R00
im for all j,m in {1,...,si}.


















by Hansson Independence, one has y00 P 00 x∗.
Close to y0, in the initial economy with n agents there exist two allocations y000 and y∗



















In the replicated economy, let y∗∗ be the allocation deﬁned by y∗∗
i1 = y000
i for all i =
1,...,n, and y∗∗
ij = y∗
i for all i = 1,...,n and all j =2 ,...,si. By Lemma 2, y∗∗ P00 y00, so
that y∗∗ P00 x∗.
But x∗ is such that for all i,j,
x
∗









Moreover, by a suitable reduction-expansion of allocations and preferences (and invoking
Scale Independence), one can obtain a situation in which the expanded-reduced version of
x∗ is eﬃcient (see the proof of Th. 1 for a detailed treatment). This entails a contradiction
with Support-Mean Dominance II.
24Finally, we have to show that no axiom is redundant.
Dropping Weak Pareto. Take e R1.
Dropping Transfer Principle. Take the SOF e R5 deﬁned by:
x e R









Dropping Hansson Independence. Take the SOF e R6 which coincides with RW if there
are agents with identical preferences, and with e R5 otherwise.
Dropping Scale Independence. Take the SOF e R7 deﬁned by
x e R
7 y ⇔ xR W y or x is fair-equivalent,
the latter meaning that x is eﬃcient and there exists an envy-free allocation in I(x) (set
of allocations which are Pareto-indiﬀerent to x, see deﬁnition of e R2 above).
Dropping Replication Independence. Take the SOF e R8 deﬁned by:
x e R













ai = n; ∀i, ai ∈ Z+,q iRixi
)
.
Dropping Support-Mean Dominance II. Take RPS.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :
Let x and y be two allocations such that xP PS y. Suppose that, contrary to the
desired result, one has yRx .
Let α,β,γ,δ,λ,µand ω be such that
min













and let i0 be an agent such that minivi(yi)=vi0(yi0).
Let (R1
1,...,R1
n) be a proﬁle such that for all i,
C(R
1









+ | q ≥ ωΩ
ª
,
and let R1 denote the related social ordering.
As in the proof of Th. 2, it is assumed that all constructed allocations below are
feasible. Using homothetic reductions of preferences and allocations and invoking Scale
25Independence always makes it possible (see the proof of Th. 1 for a rigorous treatment).
Let y0 be an allocation deﬁned by y0




By Weak Pareto, y0 P 1 y. Since by Hansson Independence, yR 1 x, one has y0 P 1 x.
Let (R2
1,...,R2























Let R2 denote the related social ordering.
Let x0 be an allocation deﬁned by x0




By Weak Pareto, xP 2 x0. Since by Hansson Independence, y0 P 2 x, one obtains y0 P 2 x0.
Let x00 be an allocation deﬁned by x00




By Lemma 2, one has x0 P2 x00, and therefore y0 P 2 x00.
Let (R3
1,...,R3
























+ | q ≥ βΩ
ª







+ | q ≥ δΩ
ª
.
Let x∗ be an allocation deﬁned by x∗
i = δΩ for all i. By Weak Pareto, x00 P3 x∗. Since
by Hansson Independence, y0 P 3 x00, one then has y0 P 3 x∗.
Let y00 be an allocation deﬁned by y00

















Therefore, by Lemma 2, y00 P3 y0, so that by transitivity, y00 P 3 x∗.
But x∗ is egalitarian, and since nδ > (n − 1)β + λ, one has for all i,
x
∗
i = δΩ À y00 =
1
n
[(n − 1)β + λ]Ω À miny
00 = λΩ.
26Moreover, by a suitable reduction-expansion of allocations and preferences (and invoking
Scale Independence), one can obtain a situation in which the expanded-reduced version of
x∗ is eﬃcient for the proﬁle (R3
1,...,R3
n) (see the proof of Th. 1 for a detailed treatment).
Therefore, by Minimal Preference for Equality, one should have x∗ R3 y00, a contradiction.
Finally, we check that no axiom is redundant. The counter-examples are the same as
for Th. 1 (replacing Support-Mean Dominance I by Minimal Preference for Equality).
27